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INTRODUCTION
Science is built on the sharing of information. Scientists generate
knowledge to explain the workings of the natural world, building on the
information produced and shared by other scientists. Some scientists see this
construction in moral or ethical terms;1 according to Albert Einstein, for
example, “The right to search for truth implies also a duty: one must not
conceal any part of what one has recognized to be true.”2
Science flourishes best in conditions of the open and public exchange of
ideas, methods, findings, and interpretations. Openness facilitates vetting new
findings and new theories through continued study and analysis. The open
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1. See, e.g., A Duty to Publish, 4 NATURE MED. 1089, 1089 (1998) (listing recent instances in
which drug companies tried to suppress the unfavorable results of studies they helped to fund, but the
researchers, “acting in the interests of the public,” resisted the pressure and published their findings).
2. Id.
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exchange of ideas is valued not only because it facilitates the advancement of
science, but also because it is concordant with the ideals of a democratic society.
The principles and practice of open science can come into conflict with
individual or corporate actions intended to limit public access to information, or
with government laws and policies that restrict access to results and ideas.
Sometimes these restrictions are needed to preserve important values, such as
individual privacy, or to further certain policy objectives, such as protecting
national security or the economic benefits derived from innovation. However,
there are also potential costs to restricting certain kinds of information; for
example, when such suppression limits public knowledge about health risks, it
can prevent people and their government from protecting public health.
The best known and most tragic examples of data sequestration contributing
to public health disasters are tobacco and asbestos. The tobacco industry
developed extensive structures and policies to hide scientific studies whose
results were detrimental to the industry’s health.3 The confidentiality that
accompanies the attorney–client relationship was a particularly important tool
to sequester data on the powerful, terrible effects of cigarette smoke on the
health of smokers.4 Similarly, an untold portion of the worldwide epidemic of
asbestos-related disease—currently estimated at 100,000 deaths each year—
might have been prevented had the manufacturers of asbestos products not
systematically hidden the results of inhalation studies linking asbestos with lung
cancer, performed in the 1940s.5
Of course, the concealment of scientific evidence has not been limited to the
tobacco and asbestos contexts, and less well-known episodes of data
sequestration have occurred in relation to several industrial chemicals.6 More
recently, instances in which drug manufacturers withheld study results
unfavorable to their product but clearly important in terms of patient treatment7

3. See generally STANTON A. GLANZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 235–87 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Lisa Bero et al., Lawyer Control of the Tobacco Industry’s External Research
Program: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 241-47 (1995); Stanton A Glantz et al.,
Looking Through a Keyhole at the Tobacco Industry: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274
JAMA 219–24 (1995); Peter Hanauer et al., Lawyer Control of Internal Scientific Research to Protect
Against Products Liability Lawsuits: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 234–40 (1995).
See also Glanz, supra note 3, at 235–87.
5. Press Release, International Labour Organization (ILO) & World Health Organization
(WHO), Number of Work Related Accidents and Illnesses Continues to Increase: ILO and WHO Join
in
Call
for
Prevention
Strategies
(Apr.
28,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2005/21.htm.
See also BARRY I. CASTLEMAN,
ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 41–132 (2005).
6. See Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the
Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 121–28
(2004).
7. See, e.g., D. Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science:
Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224–28 (1997); B. Psaty & D. Rennie,
Stopping Medical Research to Save Money: A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 JAMA
2128, 2128–31 (2003); D. Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238–43 (1997); S.A. Rosenberg, Secrecy
in Medical Research, 334 N. ENG. J. MED. 392, 392–94 (1996).
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have been the impetus to major changes in the registration and reporting of
clinical trials in biomedical literature.
Concerned about these issues, the Planning Committee of the Project on
Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP)8 convened a symposium to
explore the scientific and social consequences of failure to disclose scientific
knowledge. The symposium placed special emphasis on the tension between
the imperative to protect public health and safety and provisions restricting
access to documents whose publication or dissemination might result in
financial harm. The second Coronado Conference,9 Sequestered Science: The
Consequences of Undisclosed Knowledge (Coronado II), brought leading
scholars and practitioners from the fields of philosophy of science, law, ethics,
business, and public health to New York City on October 14–15, 2004, to
discuss these issues. This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems includes
papers presented at Coronado II and others solicited for inclusion in this
publication.
Science has the connotation of openness; the phrase “sequestered science”
is intentionally discordant. An objective of this collection of articles is to
examine that discordance. Several articles discuss the tradeoffs involved in the
decision to sequester science. Who participates in weighing cost against
benefits? Which and whose values are considered? Is this process of deciding
what is to be sequestered open to public scrutiny—or is it likewise sequestered?
A further objective is to explore incentives, such as laws and regulations, to
enhance or limit the production of knowledge.10
The U.S. regulatory system faces a difficult challenge: safeguards are
inadequate to ensure appropriate access to the results of scientific studies
needed to protect public health and safety and the environment. Nevertheless,

8. SKAPP, based at the George Washington University School of Public Health, engages
scientists in examinations of the nature of science and how it is used and misused in government
decisionmaking and legal proceedings. Through empirical research, discussions among scholars, and
publications, SKAPP aims to enhance understanding of how knowledge is generated and interpreted.
Major funding for SKAPP, and support for this symposium, is provided by the Common Benefit Trust,
a fund established pursuant to a court order in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability
litigation. The funding is unrestricted; we do not provide our funders the opportunity to review or
approve our activities.
For more information, see the SKAPP website at
http://www.DefendingScience.org.
9. The first Coronado Conference hosted by SKAPP, Scientific Evidence and Public Policy, was
held in March 2003. At the conference, the distinguished group of participants examined the use and
misuse of scientific evidence in public policy and the implications of the 1993 Supreme Court decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The participants focused on how
these issues are worked out in the legal and regulatory arena, with topics that included the meaning of
causation, how scientists reach judgments, and whether there is a scientific method. Additional
information is available at http://www.DefendingScience.org.
In addition, the papers and
commentaries presented at the 2003 Coronado Conference have been published in a special
supplement to the American Journal of Public Health and are available for downloading from the
SKAPP website. See 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 4 (2005).
10. In the public health arena, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2671 (1976),
and the Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. § 768 (1906) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. 1-15 (1934)), are good examples of these types of legal incentives to create knowledge.
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as several authors in this issue note, excessive transparency can have significant
negative consequences to society.
In the early part of this decade, the nation grappled with a different set of
issues relating to data integrity and transparency, namely, questionable
accounting and reporting practices led to the bankruptcies of Enron and
WorldCom, as well as the demise of the “Big Five” accounting firm Arthur
Andersen. The economic and social impact of the scandals was substantial,
including a huge reduction of shareholder assets and the disappearance or
substantial reduction of the pensions of thousands of workers. In response, the
U.S. Congress enacted the American Competitiveness and Corporate
Accountability Act of 2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.11
Based on the findings and conclusions of the authors in this issue, this article
ends with a call for another Sarbanes-Oxley initiative—one for science.
Although the needs of science and accounting are quite different, the SarbanesOxley Act inspires a need for legislation that would safeguard the integrity and
transparency of scientific data vital to protecting the public, while recognizing
the valid need for limited data sequestration in certain circumstances.
II
THE SEQUESTERED SCIENCE SYMPOSIUM PAPERS
The contours of the policy debate over data sequestration are lyrically
described by Sheila Jasanoff in this issue’s opening essay.12 Jasanoff, one of the
country’s most insightful and important thinkers on the use of science in public
policy,13 explains that “[o]penness and transparency in science, then, cannot be
treated as absolute goods. Rather, the degree of openness is context-specific
and needs to be traded off against other important social values. The problem
for contemporary law and policy is to develop principled approaches to
maintaining the desired balance.”14
Jasanoff looks at issues of transparency in both regulation and litigation. In
what she describes as “public, or policy-relevant, science,”15 she rejects the
relatively superficial question of whether information should be transparent,
recognizing the greater inquiry for whom such science should be transparent
and for what purpose. As she notes, “Openness is a treasured attribute of
science, but like most good things, even scientific openness has to be

11. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
12. Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (Summer 2006).
13. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS
(1990); SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA
(1995). Jasanoff is the Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government of Harvard University.
14. Jasanoff, supra note 12, at 20.
15. Id. at 29.
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purposefully cultivated and judiciously deployed in order to serve its intended
functions well.”16
Jasanoff then succeeds in refocusing the question at hand, from how to
ensure the disclosure of useful information to how to transform the judicial
system so that it contributes to the generation of knowledge for public good.
She argues that “litigation is an indispensable aid to knowledge production,” a
fact that should lead to the design of “procedures aimed at increased
transparency, such as enforced negotiation between parties,” and that “some
forms of external review, could be devised to improve the quality and reliability
of the science that lawsuits help generate.”17
The tradeoffs between data sequestration and disclosure discussed by Jasanoff
are particularly acute in the production and marketing of drugs. The choices made
in this arena have substantial implications, both for public health and for the
financial health of the corporations involved. Three papers in this issue address
these choices.18
First, noted philosopher of science Susan Haack19 recounts the tale of the
drug Remune, in which the drug’s manufacturer hired scientists to conduct a
clinical trial but subsequently blocked the scientists’ efforts to reveal that the drug
was ineffective in slowing the progression of HIV-related disease.20 As recounted
by Haack, the manufacturer encouraged investors to believe Remune was
effective, at the same time litigating against the scientists for violating an
agreement to keep certain information confidential—information that would have
shown the drug actually to be ineffective.21 Although for a few years the
manufacturer was able to maintain the illusion that Remune was effective, the
unfavorable findings from the clinical trial eventually came to light and forced the
company to abandon the drug.22 Nevertheless, over that period, the company gave
out false information—along with false hope—to AIDS patients and investors
alike.

16. Id. at 40. Jasanoff further explains reasons for and methods to ensure such safeguards:
[S]ome common pathologies of science-based decisionmaking [are] imperfect accountability,
asymmetric standards, and excessive transparency. . . . All three affect the production of
reliable scientific knowledge, but all reflect at bottom procedural deficiencies: withholding
access from, or in some cases granting it to, the wrong people, at the wrong times, for the
wrong purposes.
Id.
17. Id. at 42.
18. Susan Haack, Scientific Secrecy and “Spin”: The Sad, Sleazy Saga of the Trials of Remune, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Summer 2006); Scott M. Lassman, Transparency and Innuendo: An
Alternative to Reactive Over-Disclosure, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (Summer 2006); Peter Lurie &
Allison Zieve, Sometimes the Silence Can Be Like the Thunder: Access to Pharmaceutical Data at FDA,
69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (Summer 2006).
19. Haack was included in PETER J. KING, 100 PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIFE AND WORK OF THE
WORLD’S GREATEST THINKERS 180 (2004). She is the Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and Science and
Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Miami.
20. Haack, supra note 18, at 52–60.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 59.
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Haack uses this case study to illustrate “how scientific inquiry can be
hampered or perverted by pressure to transform it into boosterism for a
product (or a policy).”23 Haack concludes the “scientific ethos” is threatened
when science becomes entangled with commercial interests and these types of
relationships have significant consequences for the advancement of science.24
Many commentators have noted the recent, rapid demise of the barriers
between commerce and science, particularly in medicine.25 Aided by the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act,26 universities are forming lucrative collaborations
with private corporations.27 In the medical sphere, much of this cooperation has
focused on the development and testing of new drugs. Remune was only one of
several recent episodes of data sequestration in which the sponsors of research
used their financial control to the detriment of public health.28 In response to
this trend, a group of editors of the world’s leading biomedical journals declared
they would no longer publish articles based on studies conducted under
contracts in which the investigators did not have the unfettered right to publish
their findings.29 They asserted that such contractual arrangements
not only erode the fabric of intellectual inquiry that has fostered so much high-quality
clinical research but also make medical journals party to potential misrepresentation,
since the published manuscript may not reveal the extent to which the authors were
30
powerless to control the conduct of a study that bears their names.

Although the opprobrium of these editors undoubtedly focused the attention
of the biomedical community on the sequestration of unfavorable clinical trial
results, the intervention of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has
fundamentally altered the debate. In June 2004, Spitzer filed suit against
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), charging that the pharmaceutical company concealed
unfavorable scientific studies on the efficacy and safety for children of the
antidepressant Paxil.31 Specifically, Spitzer alleged that GSK had withheld data
that adolescents taking Paxil were at increased risk of suicidal thoughts and
acts32—meaning the sequestration of this information might have prevented
23. Id. at 60.
24. See id. (noting that this pressure “damages the fragile social mechanisms that sustain the scientific
ethos of honest investigation and encourage free exchange of ideas and information”).
25. See id. at 47 (referencing the works of several commentators that discuss the potential
problems of commercially sponsored scientific research).
26. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (1980). This legislation allows small businesses and universities to elect
ownership of patents over inventions created with federal funding and to become directly involved in
the process of commercialization; it has the “policy and objective” of “promot[ing] collaboration
between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities.” Id. at § 200.
27. SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS
CORRUPTED THE VIRTUE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003).
28. See Haack, supra note 18, at 60–61.
29. Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and Accountability, 286 JAMA 1232, 1233
(2001). The statement was jointly issued by the editors of thirteen leading journals.
30. Id.
31. See Complaint, State v. GlaxoSmithKline (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2004), available at
http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/glaxo/nyagglaxo60204cmp.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Buried Data Can Be Hazardous to a Company’s Health, 304 SCIENCE
1576, 1576–77 (2004); Editorial, Is GSK guilty of fraud?, 363 LANCET 1919, 1919 (2004).
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doctors treating children with mood disorders from considering all of the
relevant scientific information necessary to make informed decisions with
patients and their families. Less than a month after the suit was filed, GSK
announced it would release the clinical data on Paxil’s safety and effectiveness;33
later that year, another pharmaceutical manufacturer agreed to create a public
registry of clinical trials data for its antidepressant medications.34
These scandals, accompanied by empirical research showing they were not
isolated instances but symptomatic of a larger problem,35 have contributed to a
change in the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the editors
of the medical journals in which clinical trial results are published. Several
physicians who have served as editors of the most important biomedical
journals have written scathing critiques of drug company practices, focusing
particularly on the publication and interpretation of clinical trial results.36 In
fact, the culture of drug testing has changed sufficiently that it is now widely
recognized that pharmaceutical manufacturers have an obligation to report the
existence and results of all clinical trials,37 although this is often not done
satisfactorily.38

33. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Statement
Regarding Decision by GlaxoSmithKline to Post Summaries of Clinical Trial Result (June 18, 2004)(on
file with author). Spitzer stated that it was “unacceptable for companies like GSK to divulge favorable
results while hiding negative data when the health of patients is at stake.” Id.
34. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Forest Labs to
Establish Clinical Trials Registry (Sept. 7, 2004)(on file with author).
35. See An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in
Randomized Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles. 291 JAMA 2457, 2457–65 (2004)
(“The reporting of trial outcomes is not only frequently incomplete but also biased and inconsistent
with protocols.”). This research arose out of the uproar around incomplete reporting of clinical trial
results, which led investigators to study the conduct and reporting of research itself. One of the
challenges in conducting this research was to identify either a representative or complete sample of
clinical trials that have been initiated in order to see when and how the results were provided to the
public. An ingenious group of European researchers was able to take this on, utilizing the records of
the Scientific-Ethical Committees for Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, Denmark, the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) through which all clinical trials conducted in that region must be registered and
approved. There were 102 trials approved in 1994–1995 that eventually were completed and published,
resulting in 122 journal articles. The researchers found that half the efficacy outcomes and sixty-five
percent of harm outcomes were incompletely reported. More than sixty percent of the trials had at
least one primary outcome that was changed, introduced after the protocol was approved, or omitted.
Eighty-six percent of survey responders (forty-two out of forty-nine) denied the existence of
unreported outcomes despite clear evidence to the contrary. Id. at 2457.
36. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES (2004); JEROME P.
KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER
YOUR HEALTH (2005); Richard Smith, Medical Journals are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of
Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 364, 364–66 (2005).
37. See C. DeAngelis et al., Is this Clinical Trial Fully Registered? A Statement from the
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 2436, 2436–38 (2005) “In
September 2004, the members of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE)
published a joint editorial aimed at promoting registration of all clinical trials.” The members of the
ICMJE will consider a trial for publication only if it is registered for the purpose of providing a
“comprehensive, publicly available database of clinical trials.”
38. See C. Rowland, Drug Firms Lagging on Openness, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2005, at A1.
Despite increased levels of voluntary disclosure by drug firms, “[a] Globe review of websites indicates
that the voluntary approach has produced limited disclosures thus far.” Id.
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Another aspect of the movement for increased disclosure or transparency is
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) new “Drug Safety Initiative,” which
seeks to increase the access of patients, health care providers, and consumers to
drug safety information.39 A component of this initiative would be a proposed
“Drug Watch” website, intended to enable FDA to “communicate emerging
safety information to the public” while it is under evaluation by the agency.40
Scott Lassman asserts in his paper that although this FDA goal of “prompt
communication of important and useful safety information about drug products
to physicians and patients” is a laudable one, the FDA’s planned website could
actually have an adverse impact on public health.41 Specifically, Lassman
projects that the use of the website “would (1) disseminate unverified and
potentially misleading safety information; (2) prompt physicians and patients to
make healthcare decisions based on little more than scientific innuendo; and,
(3) undercut well-established methods of risk communication, such as the
approved drug label.”42 Lassman’s preference would be to use the website “as
part of an accelerated labeling revision process, which would provide valid and
useful safety information in a more timely manner.”43
Although much of Lassman’s paper focuses on the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America’s (PhRMA) detailed concerns about this current
FDA proposal,44 it also raises fundamental issues that transcend the specifics of
the proposed Drug Watch website. At its heart, Lassman’s paper addresses a
common dispute in public health: when and how the public should be informed
about possible health risks. Proponents of a broad “right to know” argue that
information should not be kept from the public, even if its implications are not
yet clear.45 They argue that freedom of choice is hampered if relevant (if
imperfect) information is withheld.46 Finally, even if dissemination of research
results should be limited in some cases, they question whether manufacturers of

39. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, New Drug Safety Initiative (May 5, 2005),
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugSafety.htm.
40. Draft Guidance for the Industry on the Food and Drug Administration’s “Drug Watch” for
Emerging Drug Safety Information; Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 24,606 (May 10, 2005).
41. Lassman, supra note 18, at 69. Lassman is Assistant General Counsel of the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See also Scott Lassman & Alan Goldhammer, RE: Docket No. 2005D-0062, FDA Request for
Comments on the Draft Guidance entitled, “FDA’s ‘Drug Watch’ for Emerging Drug Safety
Information,” 70 Fed. Reg. 24,606 (May 10, 2005), (PhrMA), Aug. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/05d0062/05d-0062-c000013-vol1.pdf.
45. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and
Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991); Mary Lyndon, Information Economics and
Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795 (1989); David
Roe, Barking up the Right Tree: Recent Progress in Focusing the Toxics Issue, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
275 (1988).
46. Id.
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potentially harmful substances should be making decisions about when risk
information is reliable enough to release to the public.47
In this context, Lassman’s paper raises the issue of the control of
dissemination of vital information about product safety. As Lassman notes, the
primary and current mechanism for communicating about risks associated with
taking a particular pharmaceutical is the label.48 This label generally refers not
to something affixed to the package but to the lengthy enclosure provided to
purchasers and published in advertisements extolling the efficacy of a medicine.
Currently, drug labels are often the product of extensive negotiation between
FDA and a drug’s manufacturer.49 Opposing FDA’s efforts to establish a
mechanism independent of the drug manufacturers to communicate data on
drug safety, Lassman’s paper argues for maintaining the role of the
manufacturer in interpreting data on risks associated with drugs and in shaping
how this information is conveyed to physicians and consumers.50
The Public Citizen’s Health Research Group (HRG) has been closely
monitoring the new FDA drug approval process for several decades, starting long
before the recent, highly publicized episodes of data sequestration cited above.51
The HRG provides the public with an independent appraisal of the data that
manufacturers provide to FDA, then continues to examine the safety and efficacy
of drugs after they have been approved by the agency.52 According to the HRG,
the organization has filed twenty-seven petitions since 1971 requesting FDA to
withdraw drugs from the market, contending that the drugs were not efficacious or
that their risks outweighed their benefits.53 For the most part, FDA eventually

47. Id.
48. Lassman, supra note 18, at 76–78.
49. See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Official Admits ‘Lapses’ on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at
A15 (quoting an FDA official that the agency “[doesn’t] have the authority to tell a company, ‘this is
how your label has to look’. . . . We have to negotiate with the company the specific language of how
things should be worked, the placement, those kinds of things, after talking to them.”). This statement
came in testimony at a 2004 U.S. Senate hearing investigating FDA’s approval of Vioxx (rofecoxib), a
situation that illustrates the public health consequences of FDA’s inability to specify the content of
warning labels. It took more than a year for information about the cardiovascular risks of Vioxx
identified by an FDA advisory panel to be added to the drug’s label. According to at least one account,
FDA and Merck “battled over the label.” Anna Wilde Mathews, Did FDA Staff Minimize Vioxx’s Red
Flags?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at B1. See also Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, E-mails
Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx’s Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1.
50. Notwithstanding Lassman’s conclusions, the recent history of the marketing and withdrawal of
Vioxx (rofecoxib), discussed infra in Part III, is an illustration of the problems associated with that type
of reliance on the interpretation of data by scientists with financial conflicts of interest.
51. For more information about Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, see
http://www.citizen.org/hrg.
52. Id.
53. Sidney Wolfe, Is the FDA Adequately Assuring Drug Safety?, Power Point Presentation at the
Food and Drug Law Institute (FDLI) 48th Annual Conference, Preparing for the Next Century of Drug
Regulation, April 7, 2005.
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agreed with the HRG’s independent assessments, indicating that the HRG’s
interventions have made a significant contribution to public health.54
The paper by Peter Lurie and Allison Zieve is an analytical examination of
the HRG’s attempts to monitor the workings of FDA’s drug approval process
through disclosure mechanisms provided by two important sunshine statutes:55
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)56 and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA).57 New drug applications are reviewed by FDA advisory
committees, whose recommendations are generally accepted by the agency.58 As a
result of a successful HRG lawsuit, FDA initiated a policy to place the materials
already provided to advisory committee members on the FDA website twentyfour hours prior to each advisory committee meeting,59 enabling members of the
public to have adequate information to participate meaningfully in the meeting.
Lurie and Zieve also describe how, despite this success in fighting for
greater transparency, FDA has withheld other information that the HRG
believes would be beneficial to public health. Lurie and Zieve conclude
[a]t each step of the drug approval process, a variety of documents of potential
relevance to the public health are generated. To date, numerous contentious legal
battles have been waged to obtain access to information generated during various
stages in this process, with FDA typically weighing in alongside the manufacturer and
favoring nondisclosure. Obstacles to the release of information at each of these stages
must be addressed if optimal transparency in the drug approval process is to be
60
assured.

FOIA and FACA, two of the basic tools used by the public to monitor the
activities of the government, are also a major focus of the paper by Sidney A.
Shapiro and Rena I. Steinzor.61 These authors assert that the administration of
President George W. Bush has invoked the “war on terrorism” to justify
withholding information that was routinely disclosed by past Presidents;62
moreover, they argue that recent “[j]udicial interpretations and executive

54. Of the drugs implicated in the twenty-seven petitions, eighteen (sixty-seven percent) were
eventually withdrawn from the market, and the use of an additional four (fifteen percent) has been severely
limited. Id.
55. Lurie & Zieve, supra note 18, at 87–95. Lurie is a physician and Deputy Director of HRG;
Zieve is Senior Attorney of HRG.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). FOIA requires that, upon request by any person, an agency must
disclose documents that do not fall into one of nine specific exemptions from disclosure. Id.
57. 5 U.S.C. App. II §§ 1–15 (2000). Federal advisory committees constituted under FACA are
subject to disclosure requirements, including an advance notice of upcoming meetings and
opportunities for public attendance and input. Id. at § 10.
58. Kenneth I. Kaitin, et al., FDA Advisory Committees and the New Drug Approval Process, 29 J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 886 (1989).
59. Lurie & Zieve, supra note 18, at 90.
60. Id. at 93.
61. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I. Steinzor, The People’s Agent: Executive Branch Secrecy and
Accountability in an Age of Terrorism, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, (Summer 2006). Shapiro is
Distinguished Chair in Law at Wake Forest University, and Steinzor is Professor of Law at University
of Maryland School of Law. Both authors are among the founders of the Center for Progressive
Reform, a nonprofit research and educational organization that focuses on the government’s role in
protecting health, safety, and the environment.
62. Id. at 97.
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branch hostility have narrowed the application of both FOIA and FACA.”63
The authors further describe the Critical Infrastructure Information Act
(CIIA), enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,64 and its
implications on the public’s ability to learn more about the functioning of the
U.S. government.
Shapiro and Steinzor call on Congress to reverse the judicial interpretations
that have weakened FOIA and FACA and to restore the open government
requirements that Congress originally intended in these sunshine laws. Echoing
other papers in this collection, Shapiro and Steinzor recognize that “wise
policymaking requires a balancing of competing interests in secrecy and
openness.”65 It is of particular importance, therefore, that “such decisions . . . be
made by dispassionate and authoritative officials who have no personal stake in
whether the information is ultimately disclosed.”66
These calls for developing principled approaches to maintaining the desired
balance between openness and sequestration are underscored by Daniel J.
Givelber and Anthony Robbins, who examine the potential impact on public
health of information uncovered in litigation.67 Givelber and Robbins call
attention to “[p]rotective orders and other secrecy agreements [that] have
shielded many patterns of injury and disease associated with dozens of
materials, products, and processes.”68 While recognizing there are valid reasons
for secrecy, the authors ask, “Should courts, as public entities devoted to
dispute resolution, tolerate, endorse, or protect secrecy when the sequestered
information might help protect the public health?”69
Not all courts uniformly protect the ability of plaintiff and defense counsels
to sequester information whose disclosure may benefit the public.70 For
63. Id. at 99. Evidently this antipathy to open-government statutes has deep roots. Two prominent
members of the Bush Administration were opposed to legislation expanding FOIA when it was passed
by Congress in 1977; at that time, current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was Chief of Staff to
President Gerald Ford, and now-Vice President Richard Cheney was his deputy. See id. at 126.
(“Presumably acting under [Rumsfeld’s and Cheney’s] advice, President Ford vetoed amendments
expanding the FOIA, only to have his veto overridden by Congress.”).
64. 6 U.S.C. § 131 (2002).
65. Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 61, at 99.
66. Id.
67. Daniel J. Givelber & Anthony Robbins, Public Health vs. Court-sponsored Secrecy, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (Summer 2006). Givelber’s and Robbins’s work is itself a collaboration of law
and public health; Givelber, Professor of Law at Northeastern School of Law, served as that school’s
dean from 1984 until 1993. Robbins is a national figure in public health, having directed the Vermont
State Health Department, the Colorado Department of Health, the U.S. National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, and the U.S. National Vaccine Program. Currently he is Professor of
Public Health at Tufts University School of Medicine, and a member of the SKAPP planning
committee.
68. Id. at 131.
69. Id. at 129.
70. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 427, 490–501 (1991). One important rationale often made for confidentiality
agreements is efficiency; there is debate over a feared “chilling” impact of forced transparency on the
willingness of parties to settle cases before trial. Some years ago, Arthur R. Miller wrote that
restrictions on the use of mechanisms that sequester information uncovered in the course of litigation
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example, judges in toxic tort cases must consider this issue specifically in
approving secrecy agreements that encourage settlement and docket clearing.71
Some have issued rules “disfavoring court-ordered secrecy in cases affecting
public safety;”72 others have suggested that “[p]erhaps existing rules of civil
procedures and ethics should be altered to encourage attorneys as well as
judges to more carefully consider the interests of scientists and the general
public interest in publication of private information when resolving legal
disputes.”73
Givelber and Robbins contribute to this dialogue with an intriguing
proposal to expand the nexus beyond the behavior of judges and attorneys. In
cases in which the defendant has previously used confidentiality agreements to
sequester information about products or practices implicated in subsequent
injuries, the authors recommend allowing a jury to decide if the defendant’s
involvement in a secrecy agreement influences the defendant’s punitive
liability.74
While Givelber and Robbins focus on secrecy in court proceedings, James
W. Conrad Jr. describes the requirements for transparency in regulation of
chemicals and contends that economic considerations do not result in
concealment of health or safety data.75 He maintains that federal statutes
requiring disclosure—such as the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),76 the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),77 and SarbanesOxley,78 as well as legal disincentives to concealment, including fear of potential

would discourage settlements and result in further burdening the court system. Id. These restrictions
are unnecessary, because judges currently have the discretion to ensure that information important to
public welfare is provided to appropriate government agencies. Id. In response, James E. Rooks Jr.
has recently pointed out that there is no empirical evidence of an increase in trial rates in jurisdictions
imposing limits on secrecy in litigation. James E. Rooks Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine
Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, 870–75 (2004).
71. See Jack B. Weinstein, Symposium: Panel II: Secrecy and the Civil Justice System, Secrecy in
Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J. LAW & POL’Y 53, 65 (2000) (maintaining that while “each case is
different,” generally, “where there is doubt, secrecy [orders in litigation] should be rejected”).
72. See Joseph S. Anderson, Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against
Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 716–50 (2004) (discussing the actions taken in such
cases by the judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina).
73. Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
11 (2001). Judge Jack Weinstein is Senior Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York and has presided over mass torts cases involving, among other toxins, asbestos, and agent
orange.
74. Givelber & Robbins, supra note 67, at 136.
75. James W. Conrad, Jr., Open Secrets: The Widespread Availability of Information about the
Health & Environmental Effects of Chemicals, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (Summer 2006).
Conrad is Assistant General Counsel of the American Chemistry Council, the trade association of U.S.
chemical manufacturing companies.
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2000).
77. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000).
78. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).

01__FOREWORD.DOC

Summer 2006]

10/4/2006 9:00 AM

FOREWORD

13

civil liability—are adequate to ensure the full disclosure of relevant health and
safety data.79
Conrad enumerates and describes a variety of health, safety, and
environmental laws that involve the production of information about chemical
toxicity, but he does not evaluate the factors that encourage or discourage the
disclosure of that information.80 For example, the classification of data
submitted by chemical manufacturers to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as “confidential business information” (CBI) provides a useful
illustration of the gap between statute and practice. In a recent evaluation of
EPA ability to assess health risks and manage its chemical review program, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that chemical
manufacturers make CBI claims in ninety-five percent of the new chemical
premanufacture notices.81 The burden of evaluating the validity of all of these
CBI claims falls on a resource-poor EPA, which rarely attempts to do so. 82
Similarly, Conrad provides a useful listing of incentives for disclosure,
including the effect of potential civil liability. He acknowledges the important
role of toxic tort suits in encouraging manufacturers “not only to act on risk
information, but to affirmatively design products and services to minimize or
avoid creating such risks in the first place.” Missing from his discussion, though,
are the disincentives—the factors that discourage transparency. Returning to
CBI, for example, there is in fact a strong incentive for chemical manufacturers
to apply the CBI label in a most expansive manner, and little disincentive for
them not to do so.83
79. Conrad, supra note 75, at 163.
80. Id. at 140–55.
81. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. 05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO
IMPROVE EPA’S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW
PROGRAM 5 (2005).
TSCA generally prohibits disclosing to nonfederal officials trade secrets and privileged or
confidential information protected under the Freedom of Information Act. In addition,
TSCA authorizes chemical companies to claim data as confidential business information.
According to EPA officials, about 95 percent of the premanufacture notices for new chemicals
submitted by chemical companies contain some information that is claimed as confidential. . . .
While TSCA confidential business information can be provided to federal officials and
contractors, it generally cannot be provided to other organizations responsible for assessing
chemical risks, enforcing chemical control laws, and performing other environmental
activities, including state regulatory agencies and foreign governments.
82. See id. (“While EPA has the authority to evaluate the appropriateness of confidentiality claims
and can deny companies’ claims of confidentiality if they are found to be illegitimate, these efforts are
time[-] and resource-intensive, and the agency does not have the resources to challenge a significant[ly]
large number of claims.”).
83. See Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the
Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 130
(2004) (“Under most existing regulations, the CBI claims require no substantiation—a manufacturer
has only to stamp the documents “confidential” for the privilege to apply.”). In fact, no official from
the company need take responsibility for asserting the claim; there are no penalties for asserting the
claim when it is facially frivolous; and the firm is presumed to waive the privilege, or at least must
justify it later, if they do not stamp this information as confidential when first submitting it to the
agency. Once the information is publicly disseminated, the company loses its right to claim
misappropriation of a trade secret. Based on this regulatory structure, firms openly concede that it is
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Conrad also raises important concerns about the relationship of funding to
the outcome of scientific studies. In particular, he asserts that skepticism about
the integrity of research, often focused on studies funded by industry, should be
applied equally to studies that are funded by plaintiffs’ attorneys for use in
litigation.84 He points out that conflict-of-interest concerns apply to all science
whose sponsors have a financial interest in the outcome.85
Indeed, there has been extensive discussion in the biomedical literature on
this so-called funding effect, a term used to describe the correlation between the
results of a study desired by a study’s sponsors and the reported results of that
study.86 Several recent reviews have reported that pharmaceutical industry
sponsorship was strongly associated with conclusions favorable to the sponsor.87
Investigators have recently begun to explore whether a funding effect has
tainted studies of the toxicity of industrial chemicals.88 Still, it is important to
note that plaintiff attorneys sponsor little scientific research. In contrast, the
chemical industry currently employs thousands of scientists and supports a
substantial proportion of the research in toxicology and related fields. The
sheer number of such studies and the magnitude of potential exposure to the

more cost-effective for them to routinely stamp much internal information as CBI when no
substantiation is required.
Studies show that firms take full advantage of this generous approach to trade secrets and make the
claim for information even when doing so is clearly without merit. In 1990, for example, EPA reviewed
CBI claims under the Toxic Substances Control Act and challenged some nonmeritorious claims. By
1992, “industry had voluntarily amended and withdrawn over 600 claims after EPA’s inquiries.” CBI
claims drop substantially (by as much as 50–60%) when EPA does require upfront substantiation of the
nature of the trade secret protections, which it is legislatively required to do in other programs. Id. at
130–34.
84. Conrad, supra note 75, at 160–62.
85. Id.
86. SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS
CORRUPTED THE VIRTUE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003).
87. J.E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical
Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454–65 (2003); Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in
Science and its Implications for the Judiciary, 13 J. LAW & POL’Y 43 (2005); Joel Lexchin et al.,
Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167
(2003); Richard Smith, Medical Journals are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical
Companies, 2 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 364, 364-66 (2005).
88. See F.S. Vom Saal & C. Hughes, An Extensive New Literature Concerning Low-dose Effects of
Bisphenol A Shows the Need for a New Risk Assessment, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 926 (2005)
(discussing a possible funding effect in research on low-dose exposure to bisphenol A (BPA), an
environmental estrogen used in the manufacture of polycarbonate plastic, a resin widely used in food
cans and dental sealants). As recounted by the authors, exposure to BPA had been found in some
studies to alter endocrine function at very low doses. In response, the American Plastics Council hired
the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (HCRA) to conduct a “weight of the evidence” review of the
toxicology; the HCRA panel reviewed nineteen animal studies and reported that it found no consistent
affirmative evidence of low-dose BPA effects. Id.
This conclusion was challenged by government-funded scientists who felt that HCRA had chosen to
examine only a minority of the forty-seven studies available at the time. These scientists reviewed the
115 published studies available in December 2004 and found results that differed markedly from the
HCRA analysis. They determined that ninety percent (94 of 104) of the studies paid for with
government funds reported an effect associated with BPA exposure; however, not a single one of the
eleven corporate-funded studies found an effect.
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studied substances make it particularly important that these studies be available
for public scrutiny and evaluation.
In the final paper, Allen L. White explores the movement toward corporate
transparency in the global economy.89 According to White, increased disclosure
is driven by, among other factors, the international regime of “soft law,”
comprised of dozens of codes, principles, standards, and guidelines whose
implementation is dependent on voluntarism and moral persuasion, rather than
legal enforceability.90 An important manifestation of this movement is the
Global Reporting Initiative, in which more than six hundred major corporations
issue annual “sustainability reports” encompassing environmental, social, and
economic indicators.91
White calls for global standards for corporate disclosure, arguing that higher
standards of disclosure “build confidence and efficiency in capital markets” and
contribute to the “quantity and quality of knowledge-based assets.”92
Optimistically, he suggests that “public policies that drive higher standards of
nonfinancial disclosure, especially those that relate to knowledge-based assets,
are likely to yield a range of social benefits that have yet to achieve rigorous
measurement and full disclosure.”93
III
A PROPOSAL: SARBANES-OXLEY FOR SCIENCE
The questions discussed by these authors—namely, the costs and benefits
associated with transparency in scientific research—are only a first step; as has
been said many times, where you stand depends on where you sit. There is only
limited value in asking a beneficiary of a decision to evaluate its costs and
benefits to others.
Where does this leave us? Although there is a basic societal preference for
transparency and openness, there are situations and types of information that
demand sequestration. The tension is real and unavoidable. There are no fast
and easy rules for determining which data should be open and which held
secret. Indeed, it is very much determined by the situation. The length of time
information is held secret also depends on the situation; for example, the time
needed to avoid giving competitors a technological advantage is likely to be far
shorter than that necessary to protect national security.
Since so much is open to interpretation and the stakes are so high, greater
consideration needs to be given to the process that leads to informationsequestration or disclosure. The processes used to maintain secrecy are easily
89. Allen L. White, Why We Need Global Standards for Corporate Disclosure, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (Summer 2006). White is Vice President of the Tellus Institute and co-founder
of the Global Reporting Initiative.
90. Id. at 167.
91. Id. at 175.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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abused, and the institutional tools and imperatives that hide data are stronger
than those that promote data sharing. Rather than focus on the types of data
that should be disclosed or sequestered, or on the processes and principles
invoked to manage the disclosure and sequestration itself, I would like to begin
the discussion with looking at new statutes that could be called “SarbanesOxley for Science.”
When the Enron and WorldCom scandals were revealed, the executives of
those firms claimed that they were unaware of the accounting
misrepresentations in which their companies were engaged.94 The SarbanesOxley legislation was an attempt to ensure that the most senior managers of
companies are held accountable for providing false or misleading financial data
to regulators and to the public.95 The papers in this issue have identified a
fundamental dilemma that in some ways parallels the concerns that led to
Sarbanes-Oxley. At present, there is virtually no oversight or independent
review of corporate decisionmaking as it relates to the sequestration of
scientific data. An important lesson of the accounting scandals is that
responsibility must be linked with accountability; this should apply to scientific
as well as financial data.
In the areas of public health and the environment, as long as the choice as to
what scientific data are provided to regulators and the public rests in the hands
of its corporate producers, it seems reasonable for the public to demand a
modicum of accountability from those making the choices. A Sarbanes-Oxley
for Science would require corporations to designate a person responsible for
reporting the results of studies undertaken by the firm. He or she would have
to certify that the information provided to the public and regulatory agencies,
along with the methods used to obtain this information, was presented
accurately and completely, and he or she would also be responsible for
justifying designations of confidentiality. The current Sarbanes-Oxley statute is
sufficiently broad to protect whistleblowers who disclose certain types of
scientific information,96 but the Sarbanes-Oxley for Science would further
protect from discrimination those corporate epidemiologists, toxicologists, and
other scientists who might choose to reveal information improperly hidden
from regulators.
Science, of course, is not accounting, and there are obvious limits to the
application of accounting reporting requirements to the disclosure of scientific
research findings. For example, although conventions and guidelines for the
application of certain scientific methods and techniques do exist, hypothesis94. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and Promise of Enhanced
Personal Accountability under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (citing how
several executives of Enron and WorldCom claimed to be unaware of their respective company’s
wrongdoing).
95. Id. at 1–4.
96. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). See also Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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driven science, in which creativity is highly valued, is less amenable to practice
and reporting standards than the practice of accounting. Beyond the actual
conduct of studies, the scientific enterprise requires the interpretation of the
results of these studies, and the synthesis of the results and interpretation of
many studies. Although science, like accounting, assumes the existence of an
underlying truth, the policy shaped by science is driven by these interpretations
and syntheses, rather than by the data themselves.
The importance of ensuring that data interpretation is independent of
conflicts of interest is tragically illustrated by the debate on the cardiovascular
effects of Merck’s painkiller Vioxx (rofecoxib). In early 2000, the results of a
clinical trial showed that participants who took Vioxx for an average of nine
months had a significantly higher risk of heart attack than those taking the
comparison painkiller, naproxen (sold under the brand name Aleve).97 Since
the comparison was between two biologically active products, scientists could
have interpreted these results to mean either that Vioxx increased heart-attack
risk or that naproxen reduced it. Unfortunately, Merck’s researchers chose to
promote the latter interpretation, ignoring other evidence that supported the
former.98 Fortunately, among the clinical trials Merck had initiated was one in
which Vioxx was compared to a placebo.99 When participants who took the
drug for more than eighteen months suffered twice as many heart attacks and
strokes as those taking the placebo, the trial was halted, and Vioxx was
removed from the market.100 FDA scientists subsequently estimated that Vioxx
was responsible for between 88,000 and 139,000 heart attacks—thirty to forty
percent of which were probably fatal—in the five years the drug was on the
market.101
The raw data underlying study results are materials that should be
considered in a Sarbanes-Oxley for Science initiative. Although raw data from
government-funded studies are generally available to private parties for
inspection and re-analysis (enabling product defense experts to conduct post
hoc analyses that challenge troubling findings), industry actors are under no
similar obligation to release comparable raw data from their own studies.
When private sponsors conduct research to influence public regulatory
97. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and
Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1520, 1520 (2000).
98. See, e.g., Marvin A. Konstam et al., Cardiovascular Thrombotic Events in Controlled, Clinical
Trials of Rofecoxib, 104 CIRCULATION 2280, 2280–88 (2001); Marvin A. Konstam & Laura A.
Demopoulos, Letter to the Editor, Cardiovascular Events and COX-2 Inhibitors, 286 JAMA 2809
(2001).
99. Merck conducted a trial to determine if Vioxx inhibited the development of colon polyps; since
there are no other treatments that accomplish this, the study compared Vioxx with a placebo.
100. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx
as its Manufacturer Voluntarily Withdraws the Product (Sept. 30, 2004) available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01122.html; see also Robert S. Bresalier, Robert S.
Sandler, Hui Quan, et. al., Cardiovascular Events Associated with Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma
Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 1092 (2005).
101. FDA, Merk and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Finance,
108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of David J. Graham, MD, MPH).
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proceedings, these studies should be subject to the same access and reporting
provisions as those applied to publicly funded science. Public health is not well
served by the unequal treatment of public and private science.102
Independent processes and procedures—such as those that would be
included in a Sarbanes-Oxley for Science—are needed to dictate the decisions
to sequester or disclose scientific information, as well as to ensure
accountability to the public of those who make such decisions. In the public
sector, FOIA and FACA facilitate openness in decisionmaking, and these two
valuable statutes need re-invigoration. For the private sector, additional
accountability for those who make decisions around openness and sequestration
would contribute to greater transparency and improved protection for the
public health and environment.
IV
CONCLUSION
Data sequestration serves many functions, including protecting national
security, investment value, and individual confidentiality. But it comes with
societal costs, particularly around protecting the public health and environment,
and excessive secrecy may damage the scientific enterprise itself.
The symposium papers in this issue tell us that, most basically, openness
needs to be seen not as a simple characteristic of the scientific process, but as a
dynamic process, in and of itself. Institutional structures and procedures must
be built into a range of legal and regulatory activities so that all users of the
results of scientific investigations—scientists and corporations, regulators and
jurists, legislators and reporters—would be regularly required to ask and be
asked if their actions sequestering data are truly necessary. Further, these users
would have to consider whether the benefits that accrued from hiding the data
outweighed those associated with openness—while also considering the fairness
and impact of the ways in which those benefits are distributed.
The tension between openness and sequestration in science is not new,
although we are at a point at which this conflict feels particularly acute, and the
stakes seem particularly high.
Secrecy is often the easier road, and
transparency is not now, and perhaps never has been, the default position. We
have learned from the debate reflected in these pages that it is exceedingly
difficult to categorize in the abstract what types of data should be kept
confidential and what should be released, and to whom. Sheila Jasanoff’s words
from this issue bear repeating: “[T]he degree of openness is context-specific and
needs to be traded off against other important social values. The problem for
contemporary law and policy is to develop principled approaches to

102. See Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the
Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119 (2004).
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maintaining the desired balance.”103 The articles in this issue should contribute
significantly to the continued pursuit of that balance.

103. Jasanoff, supra note 12, at 22.

